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INTRODUCTION

Howell v. Howell1 is a statutory interpretation case in which the
United States Supreme Court held that the Uniformed Services
Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA)2 preempts a state court
from ordering a retired servicemember to indemnify3 a former
spouse for a reduction in their share of the retiree’s military pension
when the retiree elects to receive disability compensation from the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), resulting in the waiver of an
equal amount of military retired pay.4 The veteran’s reimbursement
to the former spouse of monies waived for VA disability
compensation is known as indemnification. By way of background, a
retired servicemember may only receive VA disability compensation
if he or she waives an equal amount of military retired pay.5 This is
referred to as a VA waiver. Military retired pay is taxable, whereas VA
disability compensation is not.6 The waived retired pay is restored
(and thus, indemnification is not necessary) when the veteran has a
VA disability rating of 50% or more and is receiving Concurrent

1. 137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017).
2. Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408
(1982).
3. See BRETT R. TURNER, 2 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 6.10 (3d ed.
2017) [hereinafter EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION] (defining “indemnity” as “a limited
theory, applying only to one particular type of benefit outside the scope of the
USFSPA: military retirement benefits waived to acquire military disability benefits,
veteran’s disability benefits, or civil service retirement benefits”).
4. See Keith Berkshire, Howell, How a Unanimous Supreme Court Overturned 27
States’ Indemnification Laws for Military Disability, AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS.,
http://aaml.org/library/newsletter/howell-how-unanimous-supreme-court-overtu
rned-27-states%E2%80%99-indemnification-laws-mil [https://perma.cc/M8P5/2K
XF] (last visited June 20, 2018); Mark E. Sullivan, The Death of Indemnification, LEGAL
ASSISTANCE FOR MIL. PERSONNEL, N.C. STATE BAR [hereinafter The Death of
Indemnification], http://www.nclamp.gov/publications/silent-partners/the-death-o
f-indemnification/ [https://perma.cc/ME4B-A6VP] (last visited June 20, 2018).
5. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5304–05 (2012).
6. Id. § 5301(a)(1).
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Retirement and Disability Pay (CRDP)7—unless the veteran also
elects Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC),8 as one
cannot receive both.
Howell overruled the way many state courts have analyzed
indemnification. This Note serves as an analytical and practical
resource for family law practitioners nationwide, as the cost of
military divorce and malpractice claims are both on the rise. This
Note begins by exploring the history of the relevant Supreme Court
precedent, explaining the statutory framework of the USFSPA, and
examining the historic split among the states.9 Following are the
facts and procedural history of Howell.10 Next, this Note examines
post-Howell interpretation lenses—including how the Minnesota
Court of Appeals has overstated the impact and application of the
Howell decision11—and discusses potential remedies to address the
impact of Howell going forward.12 Finally, this Note concludes that
Howell has an extremely narrow holding: federal law prevents a state
court from adjudicating indemnification.13 Although the Howell
ruling precludes a state court from ordering a retired
servicemember to indemnify a former spouse in certain situations,14
the Supreme Court previously ruled that res judicata is a defense to
federal preemption regarding the division of military service
benefits.15 The Court has yet to address whether an agreement that
divides a preempted benefit (i.e., VA disability compensation) is
enforceable.16
II. HISTORY
This section explains the history of a narrow area of family law:
military pension division incident to divorce. To understand this
area of law, this section begins by exploring the history of the
relevant Supreme Court precedent and explains the statutory
7. 10 U.S.C. § 1414 (2012).
8. Id. § 1413a.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.C.5.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. See infra Part V.
14. Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1405 (2017); see Berkshire, supra note 4;
The Death of Indemnification, supra note 4.
15. See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 586 n.5 (1989).
16. Id. at 587 n.6.
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framework of the USFSPA.17 It also provides a broad overview of the
historic split among the states regarding indemnification and
specifically touches on the history of indemnification in Minnesota.
A.

McCarty v. McCarty and the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’
Protection Act

In McCarty, the issue presented to the Court was whether, upon
the dissolution of a marriage, federal law precludes a state court
from dividing military retired pay pursuant to state community
property (or equitable distribution) laws.18 The Supreme Court held
that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution19
prohibited state courts from doing so.20 In so holding, the Court
reasoned that the division of military retired pay had the potential
to disturb the objectives Congress endorsed when it designed the
military retirement system.21 Those objectives were: (1) “to provide
for the retired service member,” and (2) “to meet the personnel
management needs of the active military forces.”22
In response to the McCarty decision, Congress enacted the
USFSPA, which took effect on February 1, 1983.23 The USFSPA
authorizes state courts to treat “disposable retired pay” as marital (or
community) property.24 Disposable retired pay is defined as “the
total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled” less, among
other things, any amount waived to receive tax-free VA disability
compensation.25 The USFSPA applies to disposable retired pay that
17. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (2012).
18. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 211 (1981).
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause establishes that the
Constitution and all federal laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution are the
“supreme Law of the Land.” Id.
20. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 220.
21. Id. at 233.
22. Id. at 232–33.
23. Act of Sept. 8, 1982, Pub. L. 97-252, Title X, § 1002(a), 96 Stat. 730 (1982)
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1984)).
24. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (2012).
25. Id. § 1408(a)(4)(A)(ii). Historically, a servicemember’s disposable retired
pay was generally gross pay less the VA waiver (if applicable), less any amount(s)
owed to the United States government (if applicable), and less the cost of the
Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) premium (if applicable). Id. The SBP is governed by
sections 1447–55. Id.
The statutory definition of disposable retired pay was redefined in
December 2016. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L.
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is payable after June 25, 1981 (the day of the McCarty decision) and
to court orders entered after that date.26
The USFSPA provides state courts with the power to divide
military retired pay incident to divorce; the statute does not,
however, require that military retired pay be divided.27 The USFSPA
also specifies that jurisdiction for military pension division is
premised upon domicile, consent, or residence within the court’s
territorial jurisdiction, except due to military assignment.28 The
USFSPA provides that state courts can order the direct payment of
pension division awards through the “designated agent”—currently
the Defense Finance and Accounting Service or the Coast Guard Pay
and Personnel Center—when there are at least ten years of marriage
overlapping at least ten years of creditable military service.29
Although the USFSPA says a great deal about the payment of
retired pay in compliance with court orders, it does not explain how
114-328, § 641, 130 Stat. 2000 (2016); 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B)(i) (defining “total
monthly retired pay” (available for division) as “the amount of basic pay payable to
the member for the member’s pay grade and years of service at the time of the court
order”).
This means that the disposable retired pay is a hypothetical amount frozen
at the servicemembers’ rank and years, or points, as of the date of divorce. See U.S.
Dep’t of Def., Reg. 7000.14-R, DOD Financial Management Regulation, vol. 7B, ch.
29, para. 2908 (June 2017), http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/
documents/fmr/Volume_07b.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NXQ-XVT5]; see also Mark
E. Sullivan & Kaitlin S. Kober, Military Pension Division: The Frozen Benefit Rule, FAM.
LAW. MAG. (Sept. 1, 2017), http://familylawyermagazine.com/articles/frozenbenefit-rule/ [https://perma.cc/BLF2-J3K9] (“On December 23, 2016 Congress
passed The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA 17)
which dramatically altered how military pension division orders are written. Instead
of allowing the states to decide how to divide military retired pay, Congress imposed
a single uniform method of pension division on all the states, a fictional scenario in
which the military member retires on the day that the judgment of divorce is
entered. This new rule up-ends the law regarding military pension division in almost
every state.”).
26. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989).
27. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (stating that state courts can treat “disposable retired
or retainer pay . . . either as property solely of the member or as property of the
member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court”).
The USFSPA prohibits a state court from forcing a servicemember “to apply for
retirement or retire at a particular time.” Id. § 1408(c)(3).
28. Id. § 1408(c)(4).
29. Id. §1408(d)(2). Generally, direct payments may not exceed 50% of the
servicemember’s disposable retired pay. Id. § 1408(e)(1). Additionally, these direct
payments cease upon the death of the servicemember or former spouse (whichever
occurs first). Id. § 1408(d)(4).
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to divide military retired pay or how to draft a Military Pension
Division Order (MPDO).30 There is no magic formula in the USFSPA
that tells a family law practitioner what share of the servicemember’s
military retired pay, if any, the former spouse should receive because
divorce and property division are state law issues.31 More
importantly, the USFSPA does not automatically entitle a former
spouse to a share of the servicemember’s retired pay.32 It also does
not prevent a court from awarding family support (e.g., child
support, alimony or maintenance) from military retired pay.33
B.

Mansell v. Mansell

Six years after the enactment of the USFSPA, the Supreme
Court examined the definition of “disposable retired pay.”34 In
Mansell, the parties signed a property settlement agreement that was
later incorporated into a divorce decree.35 The settlement divided a
portion of the former servicemember’s military retired pay that he
waived to receive VA disability compensation.36 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court held that because the USFSPA expressly excluded
VA disability compensation from the definition of disposable retired
pay, military retired pay waived to receive VA disability benefits may
not be treated as marital/community property.37 Thus, VA disability
compensation is separate (nonmarital) property.38

30. Since military retired pay is a federal entitlement under Title 10 of the
United States Code rather than a retirement plan, a Qualified Domestic Relations
Order (QDRO) is improper to effectuate the division. MARK E. SULLIVAN, MILITARY
DIVORCE HANDBOOK 485 (ABA 2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter MILITARY DIVORCE
HANDBOOK]. A properly worded Military Pension Division Order is the correct
document to effectuate the division and direct payments from the retired pay
center. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
35. Id. at 585.
36. Id. at 586.
37. Id. at 594–95.
38. Id. (holding “that the Former Spouses’ Protection Act does not grant state
courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay
that has been waived to receive veterans’ disability benefits”).
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Selitsch v. Selitsch,39 a case decided by the Tennessee Court of
Appeals, provides an excellent discussion of the full history of the
Mansell decision:
A careful review of Mansell reveals that the United States
Supreme Court did not preclude spouses from
contractually agreeing to divide non-disposable retired pay.
In Mansell, the husband’s original petition with the trial
court asserted grounds for relief including: (1) that the
USFSPA prevented state courts from treating his disability
benefits as community property; and (2) federal law
prevented courts from giving effect to parties’ contractual
assignment of military benefits. The wife responded that,
even if the husband’s contentions were true, res judicata
prevented a collateral attack on the final divorce decree.
The California courts denied the husband’s petition for
relief, holding that federal law permitted state courts to
treat disability benefits as community property. As
discussed above, the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed, holding that the USFSPA prevents a court from
considering non-disposable retired pay as community
property during a divorce. Importantly, though, the
Supreme Court did not consider the merits of the
husband’s contract argument or the wife’s res judicata
argument, and decided the case solely on USFSPA
grounds. Thus, Mansell cannot be read to preclude
enforcement of a parties’ contractual agreement to divide
military funds that fall outside of the USFSPA’s definition
of “disposable retired pay.”40
There are two key footnotes in Mansell: footnote five, discussing
res judicata,41 and footnote six, discussing contractual
indemnification.42 Res judicata is an exception to the general rule of
Mansell43—military retired pay that has been waived to receive VA

39. 492 S.W.3d 677 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that a former husband was
not entitled to relief from a martial dissolution agreement based on a mutual
mistake regarding military benefits).
40. Id. at 686–87 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
41. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 586 n.5 (1989).
42. Id. at 587 n.6.
43. Brett R. Turner, State Court Treatment of Military and Veteran’s Disability
Benefits: A 2004 Update, 16 DIVORCE LITIG. 76, 80 (2004) [hereinafter State Court
Treatment].
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disability benefits may not be treated as marital/community
property.44 Footnote five in the Mansell opinion states:
In a supplemental brief, Mrs. Mansell argues that the
doctrine of res judicata should have prevented this preMcCarty property settlement from being reopened. The
California Court of Appeal, however, decided that it was
appropriate, under California law, to reopen the
settlement and reach the federal question. Whether the
doctrine of res judicata, as applied in California, should
have barred the reopening of pre-McCarty settlements is a
matter of state law over which we have no jurisdiction. The
federal question is therefore properly before us.45
Ultimately, the Supreme Court approved the California state
court’s division of VA disability compensation under a theory of res
judicata.46 Res judicata is indisputably a matter of state law over
which the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction.47 Footnote five in the
Mansell opinion “expressly permits division [of waived military
retired pay] under the law of res judicata.”48 Brett R. Turner49
explains that the post-remand denial of certiorari in Mansell50 is an
explicit refusal by the Supreme Court to reverse state court orders
holding that division of preempted benefits are final and cannot be

44. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 594–95.
45. Id. at 586 n.5 (citations omitted).
46. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.9 (“[T]he United States
Supreme Court has twice expressly stated . . . that state courts can divide military
benefits under a theory of res judicata.”); State Court Treatment, supra note 43 (“[T]he
benefits at issue were divided in a property settlement agreement, which was
incorporated into the divorce decree. When an agreement is incorporated into the
decree, it becomes for all purposes a term of the decree, just as if set forth therein.”).
47. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.9; State Court Treatment, supra
note 43.
48. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.9 (“A minority of state court
decisions hold that division on the basis of res judicata is not permitted, generally
on the basis that state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to divide any military
benefits outside the USFSPA on any theory at all.”); see, e.g., State Court Treatment,
supra note 43.
49. Brett R. Turner “is the author of the leading national treatise on equitable
distribution, Equitable Distribution of Property (3d ed. 2005), and is a nationally known
expert in the law of equitable distribution.” Senior Research Attorney Brett R. Turner,
NAT’L LEGAL RESEARCH GRP., INC., http://www.nlrg.com/our-attorneys/brett-rturner [https://perma.cc/E3YP-5LPA] (last visited June 20, 2018).
50. Mansell v. Mansell, 498 U.S. 806 (1990).
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reopened, and therefore not void.51 Turner further explains that in
addition to Mansell:
The Supreme Court held one other time that res judicata
is a defense to federal preemption regarding the division
of military service benefits. In a case decided shortly after
McCarty, the courts of California expressly and directly
held that McCarty did not prevent the division of military
retirement benefits on a theory of res judicata. A petition
for certiorari was filed, but the Supreme Court dismissed it
for want of a substantial federal question. Dismissal for
want of a substantial federal question is an adjudication on
the merits. Like footnote 5 in Mansell, the dismissal of
certiorari is precedential authority from the Supreme
Court permitting division on a theory of res judicata.52
Thus, a “division [of preempted benefits] on the basis of res judicata
is so strongly permitted that it lies outside federal appellate
jurisdiction.”53
Footnote six in the Mansell opinion reserved the question of
whether an agreement that divides a preempted benefit (i.e.,
veteran’s disability benefits) is enforceable.54 Footnote six in the
Mansell opinion states:
Because we decide that the Former Spouses’ Protection Act
precludes States from treating as community property
retirement pay waived to receive veterans’ disability
benefits, we need not decide whether the anti-attachment
clause, §3101(a), independently protects such pay.55
To date, this question has not been addressed by the United States
Supreme Court.56
C.

State Split

Prior to Howell, more than 60% of the states held that Mansell
and the USFSPA did not apply to post-divorce VA waivers of military
51. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.9.
52. State Court Treatment, supra note 43 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 83.
54. See id.; see also Mansell, 490 U.S. at 587 n.6.
55. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 587 n.6.
56. Id.; EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.11 (citing Rose v. Rose, 481
U.S. 619 (1987) (stating the case that comes the closest to addressing this issue is
Rose v. Rose, as it “suggests that the Supreme Court might well hold that a contractual
assignment of military benefits to a family member of the veteran is not prohibited
by the anti-assignment clause”); see State Court Treatment, supra note 43, at 80.
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retired pay and that indemnification was permitted.57 Although a few
states had mixed authority on the subject, the conflicting case law
could generally be distinguished by the underlying facts, such as
whether the former spouse was awarded a share of the military
pension by consent (e.g., separation agreement or consent order) or

57. Stone v. Stone, 26 So. 3d 1232 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009); Young v. Lowery, 221
P.3d 1006 (Alaska 2009); Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P.2d 1257 (Alaska 1992); In re
Marriage of Howell, 361 P.3d 936 (Ariz. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017); In re
Falkow, No. 2 CA-CV 2012-0096, 2013 WL 485678 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2013); In
re Marriage of Krempin, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); In re Marriage
of Warkocz, 141 P.3d 926 (Colo. App. 2006); Getka v. Getka, No.
KNOFA074107032S, 2010 WL 625791 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2010); Blann v.
Blann, 971 So. 2d 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Jaylo v. Jaylo, 248 P.3d 1219 (Haw.
Ct. App. 2011); Perez v. Perez, 110 P.3d 409 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005); Bienvenue v.
Bienvenue, 72 P.3d 531 (Haw. Ct. App. 2003); McHugh v. McHugh, 861 P.2d 113
(Idaho Ct. App. 1993); In re Marriage of Neilsen & Magrini, 792 N.E.2d 844 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2003); Bandini v. Bandini, 935 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); In re
Marriage of Carlson, No. 13-1854, 2015 WL 576014 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015);
In re Marriage of Gahagen, 690 N.W.2d 695 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004); Black v. Black,
842 A.2d 1280 (Me. 2004); Pere v. Pere, No. 2279, 2016 WL 4415360 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. Aug. 19, 2016); Wilson v. Wilson, 117 A.3d 138 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015);
Dziamko v. Chuhaj, 996 A.2d 893 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); Allen v. Allen, 941
A.2d 510 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); Dexter v. Dexter, 661 A.2d 171 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1995); Krapf v. Krapf, 786 N.E.2d 318 (Mass. 2003); McGee v. Carmine, 802
N.W.2d 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010); Gatfield v. Gatfield, 682 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2004); Shelton v. Shelton, 78 P.3d 507 (Nev. 2003); Hodgins v. Hodgins, 497
A.2d 1187 (N.H. 1985); Whitfield v. Whitfield, 862 A.2d 1187 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2004); Torwich v. Torwich, 660 A.2d 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995);
Scheidel v. Scheidel, 4 P.3d 670 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000); Bagley v. Bagley, No. 2010CA-17, 2011 WL 944190 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2011); Hodge v. Hodge, 197 P.3d
511 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008); Hayes v. Hayes, 164 P.3d 1128 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007);
In re Marriage of Hayes, 208 P.3d 1046 (Ore. Ct. App. 2009); Morgante v. Morgante,
119 A.3d 382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015); Hayward v. Hayward, 868 A. 2d 554 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2005); Resare v. Resare, 908 A.2d 1006 (R.I. 2006); Hisgen v. Hisgen, 554 N.W.2d
494 (S.D. 1996); Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892 (Tenn. 2001); Selitsch v.
Selitsch, 492 S.W.3d 677 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015); Pederson v. Pederson, Nos. 117815-4, 2093-15-4, 2016 WL 4088875 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2016); Jones v. Jones, No.
0062-15-2, 2016 WL 389492 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2016); Poziombke v. Poziombke,
No. 1150-05-1, 2006 WL 325296 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2006); Hubble v. Hubble, No.
2015-01-4, 2002 WL 1809078 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2002); Owen v. Owen, 419 S.E.2d
267 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); In re Marriage of Ocasio-Santiago & Rockwood, 198 Wash.
App. 1026 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017); see Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act in State Court Divorce
Proceedings, 59 A.L.R.6th 433 (2015).
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by adjudication.58 Only a small minority of states did not permit
indemnification.59
1. Minnesota
Historically, Minnesota has been a pro-indemnification state.
In Gatfield v. Gatfield,60 the parties included the following
indemnification clause in their stipulated Virginia dissolution
judgement:

58. See Copas v. Copas, 359 S.W.3d 471 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (holding a former
husband’s military disability benefits were not subject to division as marital property
in post-dissolution proceeding, even though husband’s election to receive the
disability benefits reduced former wife’s share of husband’s “disposable military
retired pay”); Morgan v. Morgan, 249 S.W.3d 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Tirado v.
Tirado, 530 S.E.2d 128 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000); Wright v. Wright, 594 So. 2d 1139 (La.
Ct. App. 1992).
Compare Surratt v. Surratt, 148 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that the veteran was obligated to pay the former spouse her full share of
retired pay, regardless of whether the veteran continued to draw “disposable retired
pay” as defined in the USFSPA), with Ashley v. Ashley, 990 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Ark.
1999) (holding that under the USFSPA, the former spouse was no longer entitled
to the amount awarded in the divorce because the veteran’s disposable retired pay
was reduced due to a VA waiver).
Compare Hillard v. Hillard, 733 S.E.2d 176, 180–81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012)
(holding that a judge can require reimbursement if a VA waiver comes into play
post-divorce), with Halstead v. Halstead, 596 S.E.2d 353, 358 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that a judge cannot order indemnification at the outset), and White v.
White, 568 S.E.2d 283, 286 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a judge can adjust
former spouse’s share of military pension if veteran elects disability). But see Parker
v. Parker, No. 2012-CA-000079-MR, 2013 WL 2359661 (Ky. Ct. App. May 31, 2013);
Wilson v. Wilson, Nos. 2004-CA-000276-MR & 2004-CA-001648-MR, 2005 WL
2398020 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2005); Carpenter v. Carpenter, No. 2004-CA-001270MR, 2005 WL 1415554 (Ky. Ct. App. June 17, 2005) (holding that the trial court
correctly ruled the wife was entitled to entitled to enforcement of the separation
agreement but could not order division of husband’s disability benefits); Ast v. Ast,
162 So. 3d 720 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Strassner v. Strassner, 895 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995).
59. Geesaman v. Geesaman, CK92-3641, 92-7-30-DIV, 1993 WL 777094 (Del.
Fam. Ct. 1993); In re Marriage of Pierce, 982 P.2d 995 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999); Mallard
v. Burkart, 95 So. 3d 1264 (Miss. 2012); Kramer v. Kramer, 567 N.W.2d 100 (Neb.
1997); Newman v. Newman, 248 A.D.2d 990 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Hagen v. Hagen,
282 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. 2009); Youngbluth v. Youngbluth, 6 A.3d 677 (Vt. 2010);
Gillin v. Gillin, 307 S.W.3d 395 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).
60. 682 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), overruled by Mattson v. Mattson, 903
N.W.2d 233, 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
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Husband covenants, represents, warrants and agrees that
he will not waive any portion of any longevity retired,
retirement or retainer pay in order to elect disability or
other pension or lump sum or severance pay or other
compensation in lieu thereof and agrees to renounce the
right to make such waiver and election and to elect an
alternative form of retirement. In the event husband does
in violation hereof, he shall upon receipt pay to wife fifty
percent (50%) thereof.61
The husband later elected to receive disability benefits and
“waived an equivalent portion of his military retirement pay.”62 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the USFSPA and Mansell
did not prohibit a retired servicemember from voluntarily entering
into a contract precluding the waiver of military retired pay in favor
of disability benefits and requiring indemnification for the former
spouse for any loss resulting from such a waiver.63 The court further
noted that “[i]t is well settled that in a stipulation, parties are free to
bind themselves to obligations that a court could not impose.”64
Just five months after the Howell decision, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals, in Mattson v. Mattson, overruled Gatfield and held that
federal law preempts state courts from dividing a veteran’s VA
disability compensation as marital property and rendered such
property divisions unenforceable, even if they had been agreed
upon.65 The primary issue before the Minnesota Court of Appeals
was whether federal law preempts enforcement of the portion of the
parties’ stipulated decree that divided the retired servicemember’s VA
disability compensation.66 The court concluded that “[VA] disability
compensation is not among the military benefits that may be divided
as marital property, and states are preempted from enforcing such
divisions.”67 This holding is further examined in Part IV of this Note.

61. Gatfield, 682 N.W.2d at 634–35.
62. Id. at 635.
63. Id. at 636.
64. Id. at 637.
65. Mattson v. Mattson, 903 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), petition for
review denied, (Minn. Dec. 27, 2017).
66. Id. at 263.
67. Id. at 241.
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III. THE HOWELL DECISION
The Howell case is a landmark decision in family law. It sets a
precedent that only a minority of states previously approved.68 It is
crucial to understand the underlying facts in Howell because they lay
the foundation for its narrow holding. Without this clear
understanding, one cannot properly apply Howell or distinguish it
from seemingly comparable cases.
A.

Facts and Procedural History

Mr. and Mrs. Howell divorced in Arizona in 1991.69 The Decree
of Dissolution awarded Mrs. Howell 50% of Mr. Howell’s military
pension.70 There was no underlying separation agreement or
consent between the parties containing an express indemnification
clause. Mr. Howell retired from the Air Force in 1992 and began
receiving military retried pay.71 In 2005, he elected VA disability
compensation resulting from a 20% VA disability rating.72 The
resulting VA waiver reduced his former wife’s 50% share by about
$125 per month.73
The former wife sought enforcement of the original decree in
Arizona family court.74 The decree did not contain an
indemnification clause; it only awarded 50% of the military
pension.75 Thus, the former wife’s enforcement action was not based
on a prior agreement or a prior adjudication by the court (which
would have amounted to res judicata) for the retiree to indemnify
her. The trial court ordered Mr. Howell to indemnify his former wife
and awarded arrears,76 and Mr. Howell appealed.77 The Arizona

68. Supra note 59 and accompanying text.
69. Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1404 (2017).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. By way of illustration, the veteran “consequently had to waive about $250
per month of the roughly $1,500 of military retirement pay he shared with [his
former spouse]. Doing so reduced the amount of retirement pay that he and [his
former spouse] received by about $125 per month each.” Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. In re Marriage of Howell, No. 2 CA-CV 2014-0112, 2014 WL 7236856 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2014), vacated, In re Marriage of Howell, 361 P.3d 936 (Ariz. 2015).
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Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling,78 and Mr. Howell
appealed once more.79 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court’s judgment.80 Mr. Howell petitioned for review by the
United States Supreme Court.81 Given that state courts had reached
different conclusions on the matter, the Supreme Court granted the
veteran’s petition for certiorari,82 and reversed and remanded.83
B.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The issue presented in Howell v. Howell was whether a state court
can increase a former spouse’s pro rata share of military retired pay
when a retiree waives military retired pay for nontaxable VA disability
benefits post-divorce, thus causing a reduction in the former
spouse’s share.84 Writing for the Court, Justice Stephen Breyer stated
in the opinion that “[t]he question is complicated, but the answer is
not.”85 The Court held that, “[a] state court may not order a veteran
to indemnify a divorced spouse for the loss in the divorced spouse’s
portion of the veteran’s retirement pay caused by the veteran’s
waiver of retirement pay to receive service-related disability
benefits.”86
The Court reasoned that its decision in Mansell that “federal law
completely pre-empts the States from treating waived military
retirement pay as divisible community property,” determined the
outcome of the case.87 The Arizona Supreme Court attempted to
distinguish Mr. Howell’s case from Mansell by emphasizing that the
VA waiver took place post-divorce, whereas in Mansell the VA waiver
was already in place at the time of divorce.88 However, the Court
stated that this was not significant.89 The Court opined that a state
cannot “avoid Mansell by describing the family court order as an
78. Howell, 2014 WL 7236856, at *1. Interestingly, the former spouse did not
even file a brief with the court of appeals. Id.
79. See In re Marriage of Howell, 361 P.3d 936 (Ariz. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct.
1400 (2017).
80. Id. at 941.
81. Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 1401.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1402.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1401.
87. Id. at 1405.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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order requiring [the veteran] to ‘reimburse’ or to ‘indemnify’ [the
former spouse], rather than an order that divides property.”90 The
Court further stated that:
The principal reason the state courts have given for
ordering reimbursement or indemnification is that they
wish to restore the amount previously awarded as
community property, i.e., to restore that portion of
retirement pay lost due to the postdivorce waiver. And we
note that here, the amount of indemnification mirrors the
waived retirement pay, dollar for dollar. Regardless of their
form, such reimbursement and indemnification orders
displace the federal rule and stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the purposes and
objectives of Congress. All such orders are thus
preempted.91
This holding is extremely narrow. It was not based on contract
law, as there was no express indemnification clause involved. The
Court’s examination of the USFSPA in Howell does not change the
existing rules and precedents regarding express contract terms.
Therefore, it cannot be said that federal law preempts a
servicemember or veteran from knowingly and voluntarily
negotiating and executing a contract that contains an express
indemnification clause.92 Howell makes it clear that prospective
indemnification orders are preempted by federal law and that an
award of indemnity is reversible error. But it does not address
whether a prior un-appealed order awarding indemnity is void, or
whether an agreement or consent order containing an express
indemnification clause is enforceable.93
Howell is distinguishable from Mansell because it involved a
timely appeal from an adjudication of indemnity, whereas Mansell
involved a divorce decree that incorporated the parties’ property
settlement agreement that divided non-disposable retired pay.94
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1406.
92. See, e.g., Shelton v. Shelton, 78 P.3d 507, 511 (Nev. 2003), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 960 (2004) (holding that state courts are not precluded from applying contract
law when disability benefits are involved).
93. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.10 (discussing the significance
of footnote six in Mansell).
94. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 585–86 (1989); see McCarty v. McCarty,
453 U.S. 210, 218 (1981); In re Marriage of Howell, 361 P.3d 936, 936 (Ariz. 2015).
McCarty, like Howell, was also based on an adjudication, not an agreement. 453 U.S.
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Howell did not consider the question left unanswered in Mansell—
whether the parties can contract to waive a federal preemption
objection.95 A post-Howell state court has no authority to adjudicate
an indemnification provision.96 Accordingly, a servicemember is
unlikely to agree to such a provision.
The Court recognized the potential harm done by the Howell
decision: a VA waiver could diminish or completely wipe out a
former spouse’s entire share of the military pension. Accordingly,
Justice Breyer proposed two options that state courts can take to
avoid that harm.97 First, a state court can “take account of the
contingency that some military retirement pay might be waived.”98
The Court did not, however, appear to consider the possibility that
a future waiver of retired pay does not affect the present value.99
Second, a state court can “take account of reductions in value when
it calculated or recalculates the need for spousal support.”100 Yet, the
Court did not appear to consider the possibility that support can be
waived or not claimed, or that a party could be barred from claiming
support by fault, by being a non-dependent spouse, by cohabitating,
or by remarrying. Justice Breyer’s proposed remedies are further
discussed below.
IV. ANALYSIS
This section begins by discussing the potential remedies
addressed in the Howell opinion and the potential problems with
those remedies. It then discusses alternative remedies to address the
impact of Howell going forward. Next, this section examines postHowell interpretation lenses—the ways in which various state courts
have interpreted and applied Howell—including how the Minnesota
Court of Appeals has overstated the impact and application of the
decision. Finally, it addresses the public policy implications of Howell.

at 217–18.
95. See Mansell, 490 U.S. at 587 n.6.
96. Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 1401.
97. Id. at 1406.
98. Id.
99. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.9.
100. Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 1406.

1080

A.

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:3

Justice Breyer’s Proposed Remedies

The Court proposed two steps a state court can take to avoid the
potential harm Howell may cause when dividing property during a
divorce case: (1) to “take account of the contingency that some
military retirement pay might be waived,” and (2) to “take account
of reductions in value when it calculates or recalculates the need for
spousal support.”101 Both of these proposed remedies pose potential
problems.
1. Factor into Valuation/Distribution
First, the Court failed to address the possibility that a potential,
future waiver of retired pay does not affect its present value.102 By
way of illustration, a house or 401(k) plan are worth a specific
amount—a house can simply be appraised, and a 401(k) statement
reflects its value. However, determining the value of a military
pension is much more complex and requires the involvement of an
expert, usually a Certified Public Accountant or actuary.103 How
could an expert determine the probability of a servicemember
receiving a service-connected disability? What is the equation to
compute this? How are factors such as the branch of service (e.g.,
Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Air Force, Army), active duty versus
Guard/Reserve status, and general job nature (e.g., combat, legal,
intelligence, communications, etc.) taken into account? It is just not
possible. Maybe the Court meant that the state court can value the
military pension and make a present-value award.
Initially, the Court seemingly confused the distinction between
valuation and the actual division of property.104 Considering a
potential future election of VA disability compensation as a property
division factor is like trying to provide a cash award to compensate
in advance for the harm done to a vehicle in a car accident, knowing
in advance that only some vehicles will be involved in a collision and
the amount of damage is not predictable.105 Considering a future
election of VA disability compensation as a factor of division is not a
reliable or adequate solution.
101. Id.
102. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.10.
103. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., VALUATION
MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM (2008).
104. See EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.10.
105. See id. (offering an analogous scenario involving a tornado).

OF THE
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2. Spousal Support/Alimony
Second, the Court failed to consider many intertwined variables
pertaining to spousal support. A state court cannot predict whether
the harm (i.e., election of VA disability compensation) will occur
and, if so, to what extent (i.e., if the former spouse’s share is
minimally reduced or completely diminished). Even so, on the
surface level, this spousal support option seems slightly more viable
than factoring a potential, future waiver of retired pay into
valuation/distribution.106 To illustrate, when a retired
servicemember elects VA disability compensation and there is no
agreement or final order, a state court cannot award indemnity.107 It
could, however, order the retired servicemember to pay additional
spousal support.108 While this solution seems reasonable, there are
many questions that should be considered. For example, what if the
VA waiver occurs at or before the setting of spousal support? What if
the former spouse has remarried? What if the former spouse was
barred by fault grounds from claiming spousal support? What if the
former spouse was not a dependent spouse? What if state law
includes rigid limitations on spousal support? What if the divorce
occurred years ago and there was no claim for spousal support?
Since the Court has specifically listed spousal support as a
remedy, it is imperative that the state court retain authority and
reserve jurisdiction over spousal support after the divorce, as
permissible by state law. Spousal support is governed by state law, so
this remedy will vary substantially by state.109 In many states, the
issues of spousal support and property division are separate and
distinct—there is no across-the-board solution.110 In fact, at least one
state has refused to allow an award of alimony as a remedy in a case
regarding the election of VA disability compensation.111

106. See id.
107. Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1401 (2017).
108. See Family Law in the Fifty States 2015–2016: Charts, 50 FAM. L. Q. 566, 566–
69 (2017) (containing a chart showing the pertinent statutes and applicable factors
in all fifty states).
109. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 586–87 (1989) (“Casas held that after the
passage of the Former Spouses’ Protection Act, federal law no longer pre-empted
state community property law as it applies to military retirement pay.”).
110. See In re Marriage of Cassinelli, 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
111. Id. (holding that “the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy
for the loss of a community property interest”), vacated and remanded, Cassinelli v.
Cassinelli, 138 S. Ct. 69 (2017) (vacating and remanding the judgment for further
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Potential Remedies

Military benefits, such as military retired pay, are governed by
federal law. On the contrary, property division incident to divorce is
a matter of state law, and the granting of military retired pay is
implemented through a state court order.112 However, the approval
or denial regarding receipt of the benefit is determined by the
federal government (i.e., the retired pay center determines military
retired pay eligibility). Thus, “military benefits are creatures of
federal law, and the treatment of military benefits in state divorce
proceedings has been a source of federal and state tension for
decades.”113 This illustrates that viable remedies will vary by state.
There are five potential remedies that pertain to the issue of
indemnification.
1. Alimony/Spousal Support
The first potential remedy, as proposed by Justice Breyer, is
alimony/spousal support. Although VA disability benefits cannot be
divided as marital/community property, they can be considered a
source of income for purposes of alimony.114 As observed in Hurt v.
Jones-Hurt, “the impact of Howell may in a particular case constitute a
change in circumstances entitling a court to revisit an alimony
award . . . whether or not the parties or the court were aware ex ante
that a spouse could elect to waive pension payments for disability
benefits.”115 The problem lies with the timing of the alimony claim,
whether alimony is waived, whether marital fault is relevant to
alimony, and whether standard of living and reasonable needs are
relevant to alimony. All of these factors may play a part and vary by
state.116
consideration in light of Howell).
112. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 589.
113. Hurt v. Jones-Hurt, 168 A.3d 992, 997 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (2012); State Court Treatment, supra note 43, at 82 (“Disability
benefits which cannot be divided under Mansell clearly can be considered as a
source for alimony.”). “Where disability has not been elected at divorce, but an
election is pending or otherwise seems likely, the court may make a nominal award
or otherwise reserve jurisdiction to make an award of support after the election is
final.” Id. at 83. On the contrary, “[w]here disability is elected after the divorce, the
election of disability is a sufficient change of circumstance to permit an increase in
alimony.” Id.
115. Hurt, 168 A.3d at 1003.
116. See Family Law in the Fifty States, supra note 108, at 566–69.
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2. Res Judicata
The second potential remedy regarding indemnification and
the division of waived military retired pay is the doctrine of res
judicata. Res judicata is defined as, “a thing adjudicated. Once a
lawsuit is decided, the same issue or an issue arising from the first
issue cannot be contested again.”117 The Supreme Court has noted
that “the res judicata consequences of a final, un-appealed judgment
on the merits [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may
have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently
overruled in another case.”118 Accordingly, if military and/or
disability benefits are divided in violation of Mansell (and now
Howell), but the servicemember fails to timely appeal, the decision is
final. Thus, the benefits at issue are lawfully and validly divided.119
Moreover, courts around the country have uniformly held that
McCarty and Mansell are not retroactive.120 Likewise, there is nothing
in Howell that suggests that the Supreme Court intended to invalidate
or otherwise render unenforceable prior valid judgments.

117. Res judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910).
118. Federated Dep’t Stores Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (citing
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 187 (1947); Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); Wilson’s Executor v. Deen, 121 U.S. 525, 534
(1887)).
119. See Shelton v. Shelton, 78 P.3d 507 (Nev. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 960
(2004) (stating federally preempted benefits can be divided on a theory of res
judicata; relying expressly on the post-remand decision in Mansell); In re Marriage
of Curis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Evans v. Evans, 541 A.2d 648 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1988); In re Zrubek, 149 B.R. 631 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1993); EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.9.
120. See, e.g., In re Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1049 (1987); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 696 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 933 (1983); Brown v. Robertson, 606 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Tex. 1985); Ford
v. Ford, 783 S.W.2d 879 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990); Allcock v. Allcock, 437 N.E.2d 392 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1982); Toupal v. Toupal, 790 P.2d 1055 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); Baxter v.
Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1990); In re Marriage of Reinauer, 946 S.W.2d 853
(Tex. Ct. App. 1997), on reh’g in part, (May 22, 1997); Elliott v. Elliott, 797 S.W.2d
388 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Berry v. Berry, 870 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989),
judgment rev’d, 786 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1990), writ granted, (Mar. 28, 1990); Maxwell v.
Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra
note 3, § 6.11.
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3. Express Contractual Indemnification
Although res judicata provides a “defense to federal preemption
regarding the division of military service benefits,”121 the question is
whether federal law preempts agreements between parties. A
common understanding of executed settlement agreements would
suggest that “if an agreement dividing military or veteran’s disability
benefits is incorporated into a decree, the agreement and the decree
should be fully enforceable under state law principles of res
judicata.”122 However, the status of an agreement that is not
incorporated into a decree has not yet been resolved at the Supreme
Court level.123 A state court does not need to treat a benefit as
marital/community property in order to enforce a contract dividing
it, as contracts dividing separate (nonmarital) property are
universally enforceable under state law.124
4. Extraordinary Remedy
Generally, property division incident to divorce is fixed and
final, and cannot be reopened. However, exceptional circumstances
may justify the reopening of a previously settled or adjudicated
division of marital/community property. In many states, this remedy
is governed by the statute governing relief from judgment or order.
Alaska paved the way in Guerrero v. Guerrero, a case that held that
the lower court abused its discretion by refusing to reopen the
parties’ property settlement agreement and conduct a full equitable
division analysis when the veteran’s disposable retired pay ended up
being zero dollars.125 Although Guerrero was decided prior to Howell,
its principal conclusion remains relevant: when a division of
marital/community property is based on a fundamental assumption
that the veteran’s military retired pay is divisible (and it is the parties’
primary asset), it is erroneous to deny relief when the former
spouse’s share is completely offset due to the veteran’s receipt of
disability benefits.126 Thus, although property division is generally
121. State Court Treatment, supra note 43, at 80.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, “[a] former spouse’s right to enforce
a contract with the service member also has a degree of constitutional protection.”
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.11; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
125. Guerrero v. Guerrero, 362 P.3d 432, 445 (Alaska 2015).
126. Id. at 444. Guerrero involved Military Disability Retired Pay (MDRP), which
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fixed and final, a court may have discretion to reopen a division of
marital/community property when extraordinary circumstances
arise.
5. Present Value Offset
The fifth potential remedy is to offset the present value of the
military pension with an alternative asset, such as the marital
residence. Generally, to divide marital/community property
incident to divorce, it must be valued. Often, a military pension is
not valued unless the case goes to trial because determining the
value of a military pension is a complex task and requires the skills
of an expert, which can be expensive. In cases where the
servicemember is not yet retired, a present value offset award may be
the answer for the soon-to-be-former spouse.127
For example, an expert values the military pension, and its value
at the date of classification is $800,000. Assume that 70% of the
pension is marital. Accordingly, the former spouse’s one-half share
is 35%, or approximately $280,000. The servicemember could keep
the pension, and the former spouse could be compensated in the
property distribution with an asset or assets of similar or equivalent
value.
The problem with this approach will be that the parties may not
have an asset large enough to offset the former spouse’s share of the
pension. Alternatively, using the example above, the state court
could award spousal support in the amount of $2,000/month for 140
months until the $280,000 is paid up. Determining the present value
of the former spouse’s share, then awarding spousal support (nonmodifiable due to cohabitation or remarriage)128 for a set period

is governed by 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1222 (2012). MDRP, like VA disability
compensation, is non-divisible retired pay. See Military Pension Division Order:
“REJECTED,” SILENT PARTNER, ABA SECT. FAM. L., https://www.americanbar.org/c
ontent/dam/aba/administrative/family_law/committees/rejected.authcheckdam
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZZ9-75MR] (last visited June 20, 2018).
127. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, 615 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
However, valuing a military pension when the servicemember has less than twenty
years of service comes with added complications. For example, the expert must
account for and apply additional discount rates pertaining to the probability of
reaching twenty years of service. Id. at 681.
128. Most states will not allow this method of calculating spousal support—
except by consent—as it is contrary to state statutes. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 518.552(6) (2017).
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until the total payout is equivalent to the present value share may be
a more viable solution.129
C.

Post-Howell State Interpretation Lenses

A handful of states have interpreted and applied the Howell
decision at the state appellate level.
1. Winters v. Winters
Winters v. Winters,130 an Illinois Court of Appeals case, was
decided shortly after the Howell decision. Although Winters does not
refer to Howell, it correctly applied the principles that Howell
examined. Winters is distinguishable from Howell because it involved
a consent order with an indemnification provision.131
When the parties divorced in 2014 (pre-Howell), the husband, a
retired servicemember, was receiving military retired pay and VA
disability compensation.132 The court entered a judgment for
dissolution of marriage that awarded the wife one-half of the
retiree’s gross military retired pay and included an indemnification
provision.133 The husband filed a timely motion for relief and argued
that part of his military pension consisted of VA disability
compensation that was not subject to division under the USFSPA.134
Subsequently, the parties reached an agreement.135 The parties
agreed that the 2014 judgment would remain in effect with the
exception of the husband’s child support obligation, which was
modified.136 The court entered an order incorporating this
agreement in January 2015, which was not appealed.137 Soon after,
in April 2015, the wife filed a petition for rule to show cause asserting

129. Email from Marshal S. Willick, Principal Attorney, Willick Law Grp., to
Mark E. Sullivan, Principal Attorney, Sullivan & Tanner, P.A., et al. (Sept. 26, 2017,
17:39 EST) (on file with author).
130. No. 5-16-0217, 2017 WL 3276408 (Ill. App. Ct. July 31, 2017).
131. Id. at *1.
132. Id.
133. Id. The indemnification provision required the husband “to pay Wife the
difference between any money she would lose were Husband to opt for VA benefits,
or anything else he might do to reduce Wife’s share of Husband’s pension.” Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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that the husband was not making proper payments to her.138 In July
2015, the parties entered into a consent order, which reduced the
wife’s share of the military pension to $1,609.84 per month.139 The
husband did not appeal.140
In November 2015, the wife filed a motion to enforce, again
asserting that the husband was not making proper payments to
her.141 The husband again argued that part of the $1,609.84 he was
required to pay was VA disability compensation.142 The court
enforced the July 2015 consent order, and ordered him to pay the
full amount.143 An appeal followed.144
On appeal, the husband concurred that $2,210.47 of his military
retired pay was attributable to VA disability compensation, which is
excluded from disposable retired pay.145 He argued that his former
spouse was only entitled to 50% of his disposable retired pay under
the USFSPA.146 Although VA disability compensation is excluded
from disposable retired pay, the husband ignored two other factors
that applied in his case.147 First, the husband never appealed the
original judgment awarding his former spouse one-half of gross
military retired pay, nor did he appeal any subsequent order on the
basis that a large portion of his military pension was attributable to
VA disability compensation.148 Therefore, the doctrine of res
judicata applies.
Second, the husband agreed to pay his former spouse a certain
amount.149 Although he could not be forced, he could still

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. Additionally, the husband did not file a motion for reconsideration. Id.
141. Id. at *2.
142. Id. According to the husband, one-half of his military retired pay was
approximately $500 per month (since a VA wavier was in place), thus he was not
required to pay in excess of that. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. Furthermore, “Husband was the one who supplied the court with his
retirement pay figures. Husband is the one who withdrew his motions to change the
amount of support and/or chose not to pursue his arguments that a large portion
of his retirement benefits could not be used in calculating the amount of support
Wife could receive.” Id.
149. Id.
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voluntarily choose to do so.150 He agreed to pay an amount in excess
of what was permitted under the USFSPA.151 Thus, the argument the
husband made on appeal is an argument which he waived in prior
court proceedings and by the entry of consent orders that were not
appealed.152 In summary, the retired servicemember’s postretirement agreement to pay his former spouse a share of his military
pension, together with the doctrine of res judicata, barred his later
claim that he did not have to indemnify his former spouse for
amounts waived for VA disability compensation. The Illinois Court
of Appeals correctly affirmed.
2. Bloom v. Bloom
Bloom v. Bloom,153 a Pennsylvania Superior Court case, was also
decided shortly after the Howell decision. Like Winters, the Bloom
opinion does not specifically refer to Howell, but it correctly applies
the principles examined in Howell. Bloom is distinguishable from
Howell because it involves an agreement incorporated in a judgment
with language regarding “retirement pay from the U.S. Army” rather
than disposable retired pay.154
The parties divorced in 1992 (pre-Howell) and their settlement
agreement was incorporated in a divorce decree.155 It provided the
former wife with 50% of the retired former husband’s “retirement
pay from the U.S. Army for as long as she lives.”156 About twenty
years later, the former husband was declared completely disabled.157
He qualified for tax-free CRSC,158 thus waiving the entirety of his
disposable retired pay.159 Accordingly, the former wife’s payments
ceased.160

150. Id.
151. Id. (“A party can agree to pay more than is allowable under any statute. He
cannot be forced to do so, but he can voluntarily choose to do so.”).
152. Id.
153. No. 1443 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 3225862 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 31, 2017).
154. Id. at *6.
155. Id. at *1.
156. Id. at *4.
157. Id. at *1. He had to resign from his high school teaching position. Id.
158. 10 U.S.C. § 1413a (2012).
159. Bloom, 2017 WL 3225862, at *1.
160. Id.
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The former wife filed a petition for enforcement, alleging that
the cessation of payments violated their settlement agreement.161
After a hearing on the matter, the court ordered the former husband
to reinstitute payments to the former wife, as required by their
divorce settlement agreement.162 The court reasoned that the
election of CRSC in lieu of military retired pay amounted to “a
‘unilateral and extrajudicial modification of the decree,’ depriving
[wife] of the bargained-for benefits included in the divorce
decree.”163 It further reasoned that “so long as the court’s order
avoids specifying an ‘improper source of funds’ for payments to be
made in conformity with the decree, there will be no violation of
[Mansell].”164
On the husband’s appeal, the court affirmed the trial court’s
decision to provide the wife with an equitable remedy.165 The court
stated that the settlement agreement was intended to ensure the wife
“receiv[ed] a share of [h]usband’s ‘retirement pay from the U.S.
Army’” as opposed to disposable retirement pay.166 The court further
reasoned that Mansell “does not stand for the proposition that the
trial court must determine that a party can satisfy his contractual
obligations, but only that such satisfaction cannot be attached
directly to the party’s military disability pay.”167
In summary, the retiree’s post-retirement agreement to pay his
former wife a share of his military pension, together with the
doctrine of res judicata, barred his later claim that he did not have
to indemnify his former wife for amounts waived for CRSC. The
Superior Court of Pennsylvania correctly affirmed.

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
164. Id. (citations omitted). “Hence, it concluded that Husband breached a
valid contract when he unilaterally changed the source of his monthly benefits so
that Wife no longer received her share of his retirement funds. The court
determined that Wife was entitled to receive the benefit of the bargain, but
refrained from attaching Wife’s payments to Husband’s CRSC benefits. Instead it
ordered Husband to pay Wife the damages flowing from his breach of contract.” Id.
165. Id. at *6.
166. Id.
167. Id. (“Although some courts have utilized alternative sources of income in
rendering an equitable judgment, we find no language in Mansell which mandates
such a finding.”).
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3. Hurt v. Jones-Hurt and Stojka v. Stojka
Hurt v. Jones-Hurt,168 a Maryland Court of Special Appeals case,
is the first case to recognize and interpret Howell. When the parties
divorced in 2004, the trial court awarded the wife of a military retiree
one-third of the marital share of the husband’s military pension.169
The court was unaware that the husband had a 10% VA disability
rating and was receiving VA disability compensation at the time of
the divorce.170
Some years later, the husband began drawing retired pay, and
his VA disability rating had increased to 30%.171 Over the course of
three different orders, the court ruled that the former wife was
entitled to the same overall dollar amount for the retired
servicemember’s military retired pay, notwithstanding the reduction
for the VA waiver.172 Essentially, the court ordered that the husband
“shall pay to [wife] the differential between the amount [wife]
receives directly from the government . . . and the full amount of the
pension she is entitled to receive pursuant to the divorce
judgment.”173 Thus, absent a prior agreement or consent order, the
court ordered the retired servicemember to indemnify his former
wife for a reduction in her retired pay share due to a VA waiver—a
prime example of adjudicated indemnification. The husband timely
appealed.174
The Howell decision was issued after oral arguments had been
made in Hurt.175 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
incorrectly and unnecessarily asserted that Howell overruled the
Maryland state precedent in support of indemnification.176 It should
have found that Howell did not overrule prior Maryland

168. 168 A.3d 992 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017).
169. Id. at 994. Although he was already retired from the Army National Guard,
he would not begin to draw retired pay until the age of sixty. 10 U.S.C. § 12731(f)(1)
(2012).
170. Hurt, 168 A.3d at 994.
171. Id. at 995.
172. Id. at 994.
173. Id. at 996.
174. Id. at 997.
175. Id. at 1001.
176. Id. at 1002.
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precedent—Allen,177 Dexter,178 and Wilson179—as the underlying facts
were distinguishable in those cases.
The court reasoned that the veteran’s choice to elect VA
disability benefits overrode the court’s ability to amend the marital
property award to reflect post-judgment changes in circumstances.180
The court noted that “[a]lthough the circuit court could not have
known this at the time, we now know that military retirement
benefits are always contingent, whether or not the veteran has a
disability rating at the time of divorce.”181 The court further noted
that “[t]he possibility of a new disability rating is always out there,
and parties and courts must account for (and attempt to predict the
likelihood of) these contingencies when valuing military retirement
pay.”182
In summary, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed
the judgment of the circuit court and held that a judge could not
order reimbursement/indemnification for a former spouse when
the veteran’s VA disability rating (increased from 10% to 30%)
diminished the former spouse’s share of military retired pay.183
However, it is important to note that Hurt, like Howell, is not a
contract case, as there was no agreement between the parties and no
consent order. Additionally, there was at least one prior un-appealed
order.
Stojka v. Stojka,184 another Maryland Court of Special Appeals
case, further interprets Howell and Hurt. The issue presented in Stojka
was whether the trial court erred by including language in the
parties’ divorce judgment that indefinitely reserved jurisdiction over

177. Allen v. Allen, 941 A.2d 510, 516 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (stating that
the term “pension/retirement plans” included “all retirement benefits accrued as a
result of appellant’s military service”).
178. Dexter v. Dexter, 661 A.2d 171, 174–75 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (finding
that the parties reached an agreement regarding the division of one spouse’s
military pension, and that agreement was read into the record and incorporated
into their divorce judgment).
179. Wilson v. Wilson, 117 A.3d 138, 140 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (affirming
a district court’s holding that a disabled military retiree breached the property
settlement with his former wife when he did not increase her payment after his
increased disability earnings).
180. Hurt, 168 A.3d at 1002.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. No. 1496, 2017 WL 5036322 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 2, 2017).
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the parties and their personal property if the former spouse’s share
of the veteran’s military retired pay was reduced.185 Essentially, the
trial court retained jurisdiction to modify the pension division
payments in the event the former spouse’s share of the
servicemember’s military retired pay was later reduced due to a VA
waiver or for any other reason.186 Upon the servicemember’s timely
appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals properly held that
the portion of the judgment pertaining to indemnification for a VA
waiver violated the USFSPA because the servicemember did not
consent to it.187 Accordingly, the trial court was directed to strike the
portion of the judgment “retaining jurisdiction to modify the
pension division payments should [the servicemember] waive gross
military retire[d] pay for VA disability compensation.”188
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals holding is consistent
with Howell.189 However, the court properly distinguished Stojka from
Howell and Hurt by noting that “the court contemplated the ability to
maintain continuing jurisdiction to revisit the division of pension
payments not only in the case of potential disability, but also if [the
servicemember] saw a reduction in force or was not selected for
promotion.”190 Thus, the appellate court did not declare that the
trial court may not retain any jurisdiction over its judgment
regarding the military pension; the court only restricted the
retention of jurisdiction regarding indemnification.191
4. Vlach v. Vlach
Vlach v. Vlach192 is a Tennessee Court of Appeals case that
involved a 2002 (pre-Howell) final decree of divorce, which
incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement.193 The
agreement included a provision dividing the servicemember’s

185. Id. at *1.
186. Id. at *4.
187. Id. at *8.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. The servicemember testified during trial that although he has over
seventeen years of active duty military service, he may not attain the twenty years
necessary to receive military retired pay. Id. at *2.
191. Id. at *9.
192. No. M2015-01569-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 4864991 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27,
2017).
193. Id. at *1.
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military retired pay and considered that the servicemember’s receipt
of disability benefits may affect his retired pay.194 The agreement
specifically stated that it was the court’s “intention that if the [former
spouse] receives a deduction from [the servicemember’s] military
retirement pension, such as for an election of VA disability, then the
percentage of the military retirement pension will be adjusted to
equal the same dollar sum as if no disability or similar deduction was
made.”195 Thus, it contained an indemnification clause. It was not
appealed.
The final decree of divorce was not sufficient to effectuate direct
payments from the retired pay center, so the servicemember’s
former wife sought a clarifying order.196 A clarifying order was
granted, which awarded the former wife 26% of the veteran’s “total
military retired pay.”197 The clarifying order further stated that, “[i]f
[the retiree] becomes classified as 74% or more disabled, he may
petition th[e] court for appropriate relief.”198 Shortly thereafter, the
retiree received a VA disability rating of 100%.199 He petitioned the
court for relief, but the court determined that he was not relieved of
his obligation to pay his former wife 26% of his military retired
pay.200 The retiree timely appealed.201
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals acknowledged that
the marital dissolution agreement included an indemnification
provision.202 Indemnification was not applicable to this case,
however, because the retiree’s 100% VA disability rating did not
cause a reduction in his military retired pay because he was eligible
for receipt of CRDP.203 However, the court incorrectly held that “the
provision runs afoul of [Howell] and is unenforceable.”204 This is
incorrect because the parties’ marital dissolution agreement was a
contract that was entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and it was
194. Id. The marital dissolution agreement included a definition of “disposable
retirement pension” that was contrary to the statutory definition. See id. at *6; see also
10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A) (2012).
195. Vlach, 2017 WL 4864991, at *1.
196. Id.
197. Id. at *2.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *4.
203. See 10 U.S.C. § 1414 (2008).
204. Vlach, 2017 WL 4864991, at *5.
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incorporated into the parties’ final decree of divorce, which was not
appealed.205 Had indemnification been at issue in this case, contract
law and res judicata would apply.206 Furthermore, there is nothing in
Howell that suggests that the Supreme Court intended to invalidate,
or otherwise render unenforceable, prior valid judgments.207
In summary, the Tennessee Court of Appeals properly affirmed
the judgement of the trial court, as modified to reflect that the
former spouse’s share is a percentage of disposable retired pay
rather than total retired pay.208 Nevertheless, the court incorrectly
concluded that (pre-Howell) indemnification clauses are
unenforceable.209
5. Mattson v. Mattson
Minnesota was one of the first states to examine and apply the
Howell decision. Mattson v. Mattson210 involved a stipulated divorce
decree. The former spouse was to receive 40% of the veteran’s “gross
monthly military retirement pay” and 40% of “the gross amount of
[the veteran’s] military disability compensation” that he received
from the VA.211 The decree was not appealed,212 which distinguishes
this case from Howell. However, as in Howell, there was no underlying
agreement or contract between the parties containing an express
indemnification clause.213
The veteran “made only sporadic payments on his obligations
under the decree, resulting in substantial arrearages.”214 The former
spouse sought enforcement, and the district court granted
205. See id. at *1.
206. The court acknowledged that “[i]n order to understand the language used
in the [marital dissolution agreement], one must understand federal law governing
military retirement pay at the time the [marital dissolution agreement] was drafted.”
Id. at *2. However, the court seemed to disregard this in their analysis.
207. With great uniformity, case law around the country has held that McCarty
and Mansell are not retroactive. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. Applying
Howell retroactively would create serious public policy implications.
208. Vlach, 2017 WL 4864991, at *6.
209. See id. at *4.
210. 903 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
211. Id. at 236.
212. Id. (stipulating that the issues on appeal are limited to the states authority
to enforce division of military benefits and the awarding of attorney fees).
213. Id. at 243 (explaining that the court relied on Minnesota Statute section
518.14, subdivision 1 as the basis for awarding the wife attorney fees and costs).
214. Id. at 236.
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relief—ordering the veteran to pay the military retired pay and
disability compensation due pursuant to the stipulated divorce
decree.215 The veteran subsequently appealed.216 The issue before
the Minnesota Court of Appeals was whether federal law preempts
enforcement of the parties’ stipulated decree dividing the veteran’s
disability compensation.217
When the court examined Gatfield and applied Howell, it failed
to distinguish a key fact. Gatfield involved an express contractual
indemnification clause, whereas Howell did not;218 the Howell case
involved court adjudicated indemnification.219 Thus the court’s
reasoning in Mattson, stated below, is flawed:
In light of Howell, we conclude that our holding in Gatfield
has been functionally overruled. In Gatfield, we held that
principles of contract and res judicata could render a
stipulated decree indemnifying an ex-spouse enforceable,
even if it ran afoul of Mansell, because “parties are free to
bind themselves to obligations that a court could not
impose.” But, as clarified in Howell, such equitable
compensation degrees do not escape federal preemption
and are simply unenforceable.220
The court failed to recognize that the decision in Howell is
extremely narrow. The issue in Howell was the court’s post-divorce
adjudication of indemnification when there was no underlying
agreement or stipulation containing an express indemnification
clause.221 Thus, Howell does not change the existing laws and
precedent regarding express contract terms that are entered into
voluntarily. Furthermore, the court should have applied the
doctrine of res judicata, as the initial stipulated divorce decree was
not appealed.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals ultimately determined that
“[f]ederal law preempts state courts from dividing a veteran’s military
disability compensation as marital property and renders such property

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1404 (2017); see also Gatfield v.
Gatfield, 682 N.W.2d 632, 634–35 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). Likewise, there is no
express contractual indemnification clause in Mattson.
219. Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 1404.
220. Mattson, 903 N.W.2d at 241 (citations omitted).
221. Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 1402.
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divisions unenforceable, even if agreed upon.”222 But the public
policy implications for such a determination are unclear, as “[i]t is
difficult to see how federal interests are harmed to a greater degree
when the owning spouse voluntarily consents to a contract dividing
the benefits.”223 It is a common misconception that a veteran’s
disability benefits are untouchable. In Rose v. Rose, the Supreme
Court held that the federal preemption doctrine did not prohibit
the state of Tennessee from holding a military veteran in contempt
for nonpayment of child support.224 In that case, VA disability
compensation was the veteran’s only means for satisfying his support
obligation, notwithstanding the provision of federal law that VA
benefits are not subject to attachment, levy, or seizure under Title
38, U.S. Code, Section 5301(a)(1).225
The issue regarding division of VA disability compensation was
already decided in 1981 in Mansell.226 Mansell does not hold that parties
are proscribed from contractually agreeing to divide military benefits
that lay outside the USFSPA’s definition of disposable retired pay.227
And neither does Mansell hold that res judicata should be ignored.228
In fact, it holds the exact opposite.229
The issues in Gatfield and Howell are completely different from
the issue presented in Mattson. The chart below illustrates a summary
of the underlying facts, issue(s), and holding in Gatfield, Howell, and
Mattson.

222. Mattson, 903 N.W.2d at 235.
223. State Court Treatment, supra note 43, at 81.
224. 481 U.S. 619, 636 (1987)
225. Id. at 626–28.
226. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 604 (1989).
227. Id. at 583 (holding only that under the USFPA state courts may not treat
“military retirement payment waived by the retiree in order to receive veterans’
disability benefits” as divisible property upon divorce).
228. See supra Part II.C.1.
229. See Mansell, 490 U.S. at 586 n.5.
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Facts
Stipulated
(Virginia)
Dissolution
Judgment with
an
indemnification
provision

Issue
Can a state court
enforce a
stipulated
provision of a
dissolution
judgment—in
which the veteran
agreed not to waive
military retired
pay in favor of VA
disability pay and
to pay 50% of the
gross military
retired pay—if he
waived military
retired pay for
nontaxable VA
disability benefits,
thus causing a
reduction in the
former spouse’s
share?
Adjudicated
Can a state court
Decree of
increase a former
Dissolution
spouse’s pro rata
awarded 50% of share of military
military
retired pay when a
pension
retiree waives
(without an
military retired pay
indemnification
for nontaxable VA
provision).
disability benefits
No underlying
post-divorce, thus
separation
causing a
agreement or
reduction in the
contract
former spouse’s
between parties share?
containing an
express
indemnification
clause
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Holding
Yes. Parties are
free to bind
themselves to
obligations that
a court could
not impose.

No. Subsequent
(post-Howell)
adjudicated
indemnification
orders are
preempted by
federal law and
an adjudicated
award of
indemnity is
reversible error.
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Mattson

Stipulated
Divorce
Decree—40%
of gross retired
pay and 40% of
gross military
disability
payments

Does federal law
preempt
enforcement of
the parties’
agreed-upon
decree dividing
the veteran’s
disability
compensation?

[Vol. 44:3

Yes. Federal law
preempts a
state court
from dividing a
veteran’s VA
disability
compensation
as martial
property, and
such property
divisions are
unenforceable
even if they
were agreed
upon.

Parties should still be “free to bind themselves to obligations that
a court could not impose.”230 Although Howell prevents a state court
from adjudicating indemnification, Mattson is distinguishable, given
that Howell did not involve a stipulation to divide disability
compensation. Furthermore, Howell did not involve an express
contractual indemnification clause, as was the case in Gatfield. In
Mattson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals overreached in its analysis of
Howell.
D.

Public Policy

Since the Supreme Court has ruled on the issue of courtadjudicated indemnification, the only course of remedial action is
through a legislative fix by Congress. Only an amendment to the
USFSPA can change the Howell precedent.231 A large part of the
battle with former-spouse military divorce issues is that Congress
generally supports protections for military retirees, veterans, and
servicemembers, whereas state law is typically what provides
protections for former spouses.232 Congress does not enact family law
230. Gatfield v. Gatfield, 682 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
231. See The Death of Indemnification, supra note 4.
232. Email from Brett R. Turner, Senior Research Attorney, Nat’l Legal
Research Grp., Inc. to Mark E. Sullivan, Principal Attorney, Sullivan & Tanner, P.A.
(May 15, 2017, 12:54 EST) (on file with author).
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legislation, it likely does not understand the intricacies of family law,
and it “persistently undervalues family law policies, except when
there is an occasional political uproar”—for example, the McCarty
decision.233 McCarty caused a political uproar, which is why Congress
enacted the USFSPA shortly thereafter. Since federal law trumps
state law, Congress’s lack of familiarity with family law—specifically,
the complex intricacies of military divorce—is a large and growing
problem.234 The recent policy implications affect current and retired
servicemembers, their former spouses, and attorneys.
Plainly stated, “[t]he decision in the Howell case means that
retirees may elect VA disability compensation ‘without a price tag,’
that is, without fear that a judge may later order a pay-back of moneys
lost by the [retirees] former spouse because of a VA waiver.”235 It fully
supports the servicemember’s side in military divorce cases, and
provides nothing but positive policy implications for
servicemembers.
There are three recent policy changes that affect military
divorce and negatively impact the former spouse. First, there is
nothing in the Howell decision that benefits former spouses of
military members. Previously, “an indemnification clause [was] the
best preventive medicine to use in these cases.”236 Now, it is not likely
that a servicemember or veteran will ever agree to one.237 Even
without an indemnification clause, the majority of states had laws or
precedent allowing a remedy.238 Howell essentially takes away this
precedential protection. The precise remedies that may be available
to a former spouse who ends up with a reduced share of military

233. Id.
234. See id.
235. The Death of Indemnification, supra note 4.
236. MILITARY DIVORCE HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 531.
237. Knowing that Howell prevents a state court from adjudicating
indemnification, the servicemember has little incentive to agree to indemnify their
former spouse in the event of a VA waiver. See Allison A. Polchek, Recent Property
Settlement Issues for Legal Assistance Attorneys, THE ARMY LAW., 4, 7 (1992) (“Although
Mansell apparently would not prevent a service member and his or her spouse from
agreeing to divide the service member’s gross retired pay, the decision leaves the
service member with little incentive to do so. Knowing that Mansell will prevent a
divorce court from dividing his or her gross retired pay, a service member probably
will refuse to settle in hopes of protecting any assets the court cannot reach.”)
238. See MILITARY DIVORCE HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 531–32.
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retired pay due to a VA waiver are currently unknown,239 and the
remedies that do arise will likely vary by state.240
Second, section 641 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA 2017) 241 revised the USFSPA by
changing the way MPDOs must be written and by redefining
“disposable retired pay.”242 This new definition changed the amount
of military retired pay that the government may pay directly to a
former spouse.243 Essentially, going forward, the “disposable retired
pay” is “the hypothetical retired pay attributable to the rank and
years [or points] of service of the military member at the time of the
divorce”—this is called the “Frozen Benefit Rule.”244 Under NDAA
2017, in addition to the flat dollar, percentage, formula, or
hypothetical award to the former spouse, the MPDO must contain
the following data points: (1) the date of divorce;245 (2) the
servicemember’s retired pay base as of the date of divorce;246 and (3)
the servicemember’s creditable years of service (if active duty) or the
servicemember’s creditable retirement points (if National Guard or
Reserves) as of the date of divorce.247 This “Frozen Benefit Rule” only
239. See The Death of Indemnification, supra note 4.
240. Id.
241. National Defense Authorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 641,
130 Stat. 2000 (2016). The NDAA is a federal law that is passed consecutively every
year since 1963. It specifies annual budget and expenditures and addresses the
operations and business for the Department of Defense.
242. Id.
243. National Defense Authorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 624, 131
Stat. 1283 (2017) (further clarifying 10 U.S.C. § 1408); Mark E. Sullivan, Military
Pension Division: The Frozen Benefit Rule, FED. BAR ASS’N VETERANS AND MIL. L. SEC. 3
(2017), http://www.fedbar.org/Image-Library/Sections-and-Divisions/Veterans/
Tommy-Winter-2017.aspx [https://perma.cc/4BAU-P4G8].
244. Id. The implementing regulations are found in the Department of Defense
Financial Management Regulation (DODFMR). U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 25,
at ch. 29.
245. This is problematic because some states do not permit or are strongly
opposed to bifurcation of the divorce and the property division. See EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 3.2 (providing a summary of arguments against
bifurcation of the divorce and the property division with case citations for state
appellate decisions).
246. For servicemembers entering military service after September 7, 1980, the
retired pay base is the “high-36”—the average of the highest 36-months of basic pay.
10 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). For servicemember’s entering military service before
September 8, 1980, the retired pay base is the final basic pay. Id. § 1406.
247. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 25 at ch. 29, para. 290802; see also Mark E.
Sullivan, Military Pension Division: The Frozen Benefit Rule, Part 2, FED. BAR ASS’N
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applies to the division of military retired pay of servicemembers who
are not yet receiving retired pay (i.e., active-duty, National Guard,
Reserves, gray area retirees).248 Regardless of the state’s date of
classification,249 the “Frozen Benefit Rule” essentially freezes the
former spouse’s share of military retired pay at the date of divorce.
Third, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2016 (NDAA 2016)250 to modernize the retirement
systems for the uniformed services.251 The NDAA 2016 created the
Blended Retirement System, which went into effect on January 1,
2018.252 Under this new retirement system, many retired pay
decisions are unilaterally up to the servicemember, which could
detrimentally impact the former spouse’s share of military retired
pay.253
E.

Effect on Attorneys

Military divorce is a complex and confusing area in family law,
and thus a lawyer could easily make a serious error that could turn
into a malpractice claim.254 Military divorce law represents a

VETERANS AND MIL. L. SEC. 4 (2017), http://www.fedbar.org/Image-Library/
Sections-and-Divisions/Veterans/Tommy-Spring-2017.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q
HA6-DFW2].
248. See id.
249. The classification date is the marital cut-off date, which is the date the
marriage terminated for marital/community property division purposes pursuant
to state law.
250. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, H.R. 1735, 114th
Cong. (2015).
251. “Uniformed services” are the armed forces, the commissioned corps of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the commissioned corps of
the Public Health Service. 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5).
252. See Karen Jowers, Your Retirement: The Big Choice Nears, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 4–
11, 2017, at 22; Brentley Tanner, To Have and to Hold: Retirement Considerations in
Military Divorce, ROLL CALL, (Military Law Comm., ABA Family Law Section, Chicago,
Ill.), Spring 2016, at 11, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/adminis
trative/family_law/committees/rc_spring2016.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.
cc/7Y44-XQWY]; The Blended Retirement System Explained, MILITARY.COM,
https://www.military.com/benefits/military-pay/blended-retirement-system.html
[http://perma.cc/NE7P-P2VK] (last visited June 20, 2018).
253. See Tanner, supra note 252, at 11, 14.
254. See Mark E. Sullivan, Fact or “Whacked”? Myths and Mistakes in Military
Divorces, LEGAL EAGLE (Jan. 24, 2008), [hereinafter Myths and Mistakes]
http://www.nclamp.gov/publications/the-legal-eagle/fact-or-whacked-myths-andmistakes-in-military-divorces/ [https://perma.cc/FFB5-RFBU].
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complicated fusion of state family law and several federal statues
applicable only to military servicemembers.255 Some of the most
common malpractice matters in family law are the improper drafting
of pension division orders,256 omission of survivor annuities,257 and
inadequate knowledge of a specific nature of the law.258 Put simply,
“[t]he problem is that [attorneys] don’t know what they don’t know.
And the law is ever-changing.”259 For example, attorneys are often
unaware of the federal statutory requirements and deadlines
pertaining to military retired pay, the SBP (the survivor annuity
associated with military retired pay), and health care benefits and
options.260 While it is an added upfront expense for either the
attorney or the client, it is always a good idea to consult with an
expert in the field, as it is easier and less costly to do things
thoroughly and correctly the first time rather than having to correct
an error later on.261 The expert does not have to be the attorney of
record; he or she can simply associate as a consultant to assist solely
with the military aspects of the divorce case.262 Sometimes, a Judge
Advocate General (JAG) officer, a Guard or Reserve lawyer, or a
255. See Steven P. Shewmaker & Alexa N. Lewis, About Face—Congress Alters the
Age Old Military Retirement System, ROLL CALL (Military Law Comm., A.B.A. Family
Law Section, Chicago, Ill.), Spring 2016, at 7, https://www.americanbar.org/conte
nt/dam/aba/administrative/family_law/committees/rc_spring2016.authcheckda
m.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y44-XQWY]; see, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1408.
256. Mark E. Sullivan & Kaitlin S. Kober, Malpractice and Military Divorce, 40 FAM.
ADVOC. 38, 40 (2017).
257. GREGG M. HERMAN, ONE HUNDRED ONE PLUS PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE
FAMILY LAWYER 365 (2003).
258. Thomas J. Watson, Beware the Danger Signs: The Top Ten Family Law
Malpractice Issues, 40 FAM. ADVOC. 6, 8, 11 (2017) (quoting Brian Anderson, Senior
Claims Attorney at Wisconsin Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company). Mr. Watson
recommends that practitioners hire an expert to draft a proper order for division
of complex retirement plans and benefits. Id. at 3. Although a military pension is
not a retirement plan, but rather a federal entitlement under Chapter 71 in Title
10 of the United State Code, Mr. Watson’s recommendation is still applicable.
259. Id. at 11 (noting that it is “critical that lawyers stay on top of changes in the
law”).
260. See Myths and Mistakes, supra note 254.
261. See id.; Emily W. McBurney, Avoiding Legal Malpractice: Retirement Benefits and
Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, 40 FAM. ADVOC. 22, 22 (2017) (addressing
common mistakes that can lead to malpractice claims and stating that
“[p]reparation on the front end can save you and your client a lot of time and
money at the end of the case and keep you safe from claims of inadequate legal
representation”).
262. See Myths and Mistakes, supra note 254.

2018]

MILITARY PENSIONS & FEDERAL PREEMPTION

1103

retired JAG officer can provide limited legal assistance. However,
because JAG officers often do not “have the in-depth knowledge
necessary for a serious case, they cannot go into court, and they
usually have short-term assignments in legal assistance.”263 Attorneys
should be aware that JAG officers often lack the exposure and
expertise in the constantly changing realm of family law and military
divorce.264
V. CONCLUSION
Under federal law, the divisible portion of military retired pay is
limited to “disposable retired pay.”265 Essentially, this means that if a
veteran receives VA disability compensation under Title 38 or
Military Disability Retired Pay (MDRP) or CRSC under Chapter 61
and Section 1413a of Title 10 respectively, a former spouse’s “share”
of military retired pay could be substantially reduced or completely
diminished. Until Howell, most states remedied this situation by
applying the concept of indemnification.266 However, state courts
are no longer allowed to adjudicate indemnification.267 Howell’s
holding is narrow—federal law prevents a state court from
adjudicating indemnification.268 There are two potential solutions to
this problem.
First, a solution may be to amend the USFSPA.269 In essence, the
term “disposable retired pay” could be redefined to mean “military
retired pay that the servicemember would be entitled to based only
on the length of the servicemember’s creditable service” and
eliminate the reduction for a VA waiver (i.e., eliminate 10 U.S.C.
§ 1408(a)(4)(A)(ii)). For the sake of simplicity, this Note does not
address the implications of the SBP270 premium, nor does it go into
263. Id.
264. See id.
265. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A) (2012).
266. State Court Treatment, supra note 43.
267. See Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1401 (2017).
268. Id. at 1406 (“Regardless of their form, such reimbursement and
indemnification orders displace the federal rule and stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the purposes and objectives of Congress. All such
orders are thus pre-empted.”).
269. 10 U.S.C. § 1408.
270. The SBP is the survivor annuity associated with military retired pay; it is
governed by 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447–55. The SBP premium is deducted from gross retired
pay when computing disposable retied pay under 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A)(iv). See
generally Ashley L. Oldham & Phillip J. Tucker, The Armed Forces Survivor Benefit Plan:
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depth regarding the Frozen Benefit Rule,271 MDRP,272 and CRSC.273
Redefining disposable retired pay poses significant public policy
problems, as nobody wants to be seen as taking benefits away from
veterans.
Second, a potentially more favorable solution is to allow for
concurrent receipt of military retired pay and VA disability
compensation for all retirees, regardless of their VA disability rating.
Currently, CRDP is only for retirees who have a VA disability rating
of 50% or greater.274 Allowing CRDP for all retirees would eliminate
the VA waivers. In other words, it would eliminate offsets to military
retired pay when receipt of VA disability compensation is elected,
and the retiree would receive his or her full military retired pay and
full VA disability compensation. However, this resolution would not
provide any relief to a former-spouse in situations in which a retiree
is receiving MDRP275 or CRSC.276
The Supreme Court has previously stated that res judicata is a
defense to federal preemption regarding the division of military
service benefits,277 and the Court has yet to address whether an
agreement that divides a preempted benefit, such as a veteran’s
disability benefits, is enforceable. Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court decided in Howell that federal law prevents a state
court from adjudicating indemnification. More specifically, Howell
preempts state courts from ordering a retired servicemember to
indemnify a former spouse for a reduction in the former spouse’s
share of the retiree’s military retired pay when the retiree elects to
receive VA disability compensation and an equal amount of military
retired pay is waived. Instead, many state courts have misinterpreted
Howell to be broader than it actually is.

Can I Be a Beneficiary and Why Do I Care?, 29 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 149 (2016)
(providing a “practical guide” to the SBP).
271. Supra Part IV.D.
272. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201–22.
273. Id. § 1413a.
274. Id. § 1414.
275. Id. §§ 1201–22.
276. Id. § 1413a.
277. Supra Part II.B.

Mitchell Hamline Law Review
The Mitchell Hamline Law Review is a student-edited journal. Founded in 1974, the Law
Review publishes timely articles of regional, national and international interest for legal
practitioners, scholars, and lawmakers. Judges throughout the United States regularly
cite the Law Review in their opinions. Academic journals, textbooks, and treatises
frequently cite the Law Review as well. It can be found in nearly all U.S. law school
libraries and online.
mitchellhamline.edu/lawreview

© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
875 Summit Avenue, Saint Paul, MN 55105

mitchellhamline.edu

